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Abstract 
The so-called “TSE roadmap” was published by the European Commission on 15th July 2005. The TSE 
roadmap suggests relaxations of BSE measures in the short, medium and long-term. According to the 
TSE roadmap “any relaxation of BSE measures following the scientific assessment should be initiated 
by an open discussion with all stakeholders and supported by a strong communication strategy” 
(European Commission 2005, p 5). With this message in mind, a social scientific project was designed 
to involve different stakeholder groups, governmental risk managers and their scientific advisors and 
to get their perception of the TSE roadmap and of its implications for precautionary consumer 
protection in five EU Member States. 
This study discusses the risk perception and risk management of the Transmissible Spongiform 
Encephalopathies (TSEs) in Europe, exemplified by the TSE roadmap. The following question guided 
the international comparative study: How is TSE risk perceived by the four interviewed stakeholder 
groups in the five examined countries?  
The risk perception of TSEs of risk managers from the ministries in charge in Belgium, France, 
Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom, as well as their scientific advisors and stakeholder groups, 
were examined. The stakeholder groups were from three different areas concerned by TSEs: farmers, 
consumers and the meat/food industry. The question to be addressed is if roadmapping is an 
adequate instrument for stakeholder involvement and for risk decision-making. The study was 
supported generously by a grant of the European Commission within the Network of Excellence 
“NeuroPrion” (FOOD-CT-2004-506579).  
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Introduction 
„Since the beginning of the European Community, no debate [meant is the debate about BSE and its 
implications for human health, the authors] has affected the daily life of individuals as much as this 
one. We must not underestimate the damage that the BSE crisis is causing among the general public, 
in particular the questioning of the food chain; the eventual number of deaths remains an unknown 
quantity” (European Parliament 1997, p 22). Dating back to 1997, these words emerged when an ad-
hoc inquiry of the European Parliament made a devastating appraisal of the handling of the BSE crisis 
by both the UK government and the European Commission (Wynne & Dressel 2001). At the time only 
a few of the Member States were hit by domestic BSE and hence by BSE crises (such as the UK, 
France, Belgium and Portugal). This situation changed in winter 2000 when Denmark, Germany and, 
a few months later, Spain, Italy and other EU countries discovered BSE in their domestic cattle herd. 
In the aftermath of those national BSE crises, the European Commission released strict regulations: 
The most prominent and overarching was “Regulation (EC) No 999/2001” (European Parliament & 
Council 2001) that provided instructions for prevention, control and eradication of certain TSEs,  
released 22nd May 2001 by the European Commission. Regulation 999/2001 encompassed all BSE 
related statutory provisions: the declaration of the BSE status, the prevention of TSEs, control and 
eradication of TSEs, legislations on the import and export of cattle and small ruminants (living 
animals, meat, meat products, but also semen and embryos), articles regarding national reference 
laboratories, sample taking and TSE testing. Regulation (EC) No 999/2001 was directly applicable in 
all EU Member States. Since then 999/2001 has been modified and changed numerous times. In most 
EU countries reported BSE cases peaked in the year 2001/2002 (with the exception of the UK and 
Switzerland).1 After the implementation of strict regulation, and in accordance with the incubation 
period, the BSE figures dropped sharply in the subsequent years. In response to declining BSE figures 
                                                          
1
 See the OIE list of all reported BSE cases: http://www.oie.int/en/animal-health-in-the-world/bse-specific-
data/number-of-reported-cases-worldwide-excluding-the-united-kingdom/ 
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the European Commission, together with the Member States, considered relaxing measures of TSE 
risk regulation. 
The so-called “TSE roadmap” was published by the European Commission on 15th July 2005. The TSE 
roadmap suggests relaxations of BSE measures in the short, medium and long-term. According to the 
TSE roadmap “any relaxation of BSE measures following the scientific assessment should be initiated 
by an open discussion with all stakeholders and supported by a strong communication strategy” 
(European Commission 2005). With this message in mind, a social scientific project was designed to 
involve key actors of the discourse from various fields and to get their perception of the TSE roadmap 
and of its implications for precautionary consumer protection in five EU Member States and at the 
European level. We examined the risk perception and risk communication2 on TSEs of risk managers 
from the ministries in charge, as well as their scientific advisors and stakeholder groups, in Belgium, 
France, Germany, Italy and the United Kingdom. The stakeholder groups were from three different 
fields concerned by TSEs: farmers, consumers and the meat/food industry. In order to get a more 
complete picture we extended our study at the EU level in regard to risk management (DG SANCO) 
and in regard to risk assessment (EFSA).3  
This paper will present results of the study regarding the risk perception of TSE risk regulation and its 
proposed amendments; conclusions on risk communication are addressed in Ru et al 2009, see also 
Dressel et al 2009. After a short introduction on the methodological setting of this study (Chapter 1), 
the TSE Roadmap and its contents (Chapter 2) and the risk perception of TSEs in Europe and 
reactions to the proposed amendments within the TSE Roadmap will be presented (Chapter 3). The 
last chapter will discuss the practicality of a roadmap process for stakeholder involvement in risk 
controversies such as TSEs in Europe (Chapter 4). 
 
                                                          
2
 This paper will focus on the aspect of risk perception only.  
3
 The EU level will not be presented in this paper. See for this aspect: Dressel et al. 2009 
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1. Methodological Setting of the Study
4
 
The focus of this study is an investigation of the differences in risk perception of TSEs in Europe and, 
in particular, of the relaxations suggested within the “TSE roadmap”. Therefore, the case of TSEs 
were analyzed in a comparative social scientific study. 
In order to examine the risk perception of TSEs of different stakeholder groups and the respective 
risk management options as suggested in the roadmap, a highly flexible and explorative 
methodological tool adaptable to the respective person and/or situation was necessary. We have 
therefore chosen a qualitative approach to investigate risk perception using  in-depth, semi-
structured interviews (Boyce & Palena 2006) and an analysis of relevant documents (literature as 
well as website research). More standardized methodological tools of analysis, like public polls or 
questionnaires, were not considered as adequate to address the problem as they hardly allow 
questions of “why” and “for what reasons”. We have chosen to investigate the case with qualitative 
methods as they allow an investigation of intentions, beliefs, motifs, evaluations and justifications. 
Qualitative social scientific research asks for the meaning of something and tries to interpret the 
meaning by investigation and analysis of socially relevant data. Also we considered that the general 
public, the “wo/man on the street”, would not be aware of the TSE roadmap and its contents. 
Therefore, we selected different stakeholder groups who represent a broader public as well as those 
who are actually involved in TSE risk management in the responsible ministries and consulted 
scientific advisors. 
Relevant literature and websites were investigated for two purposes: on the one hand, the context of 
TSE risk regulation for each country was analysed and re-structured. We considered it crucial to 
embed the results of the interviews within the given regulatory, political and TSE historical context in 
order to help us understand the response of the respective country. On the other hand, key actors in 
                                                          
4
 A description of the methods and the theoretical background as well as the guidelines applied for research can 
be find in detail in Dressel et al. 2008. 
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the relevant fields were identified by literature research, whereas others were proposed by partners 
of the NeuroPrion Network of Excellence. 
The decision of “who” and “which country” would be considered relevant was made in a meeting of 
the ‘Risk Control Group’ of the European Network of Excellence ‘NeuroPrion’. A preliminary version 
of the study concept was presented there and discussed with the group. We concluded that we 
would examine five countries: France, Italy, UK, Germany and Belgium; and that we would 
investigate in four domains: risk management (including advisory bodies/agencies), farmer 
associations, consumer associations and food industry (food and meat industry, but not feed 
industry). Furthermore, we agreed that we would also include the EU level TSE risk assessment 
(EFSA) as well as risk management (DG SANCO) in order to get a more complete picture. This choice 
was motivated, firstly, by the importance of countries which had the most reported BSE cases and, 
secondly, by the reported public outcry BSE produced in these countries. 
In total 46 interviews were conducted for this study, complemented by several additional 
background talks with further experts in the field of the respective countries. The selection of the 
interviewees was based on his/her specific function and position (‘experts’ in regard to TSEs) within 
the responsible ministry or relevant stakeholder group; that is those who are responsible for TSE 
issues within the organization and who represent the respective organization in TSE relevant national 
and international meetings. Accordingly, most of the interviewees were quite senior, such as head of 
department within the ministry or organization, including chief veterinary officers, or the 
president/managing director/CEO of an organization. Depending on the responsibility for TSE issues 
within the examined country, the following ministries and organizations were typically consulted for 
interviews: the national ministries of health and agriculture, the risk assessment and food safety 
agencies, consumer associations, national farmers unions, breeder associations, organic farming 
organizations, national food industry federations and national meat (processing) industry 
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federations5. Interviews were usually conducted in the offices of the experts. Only the consumer 
organisations and food industry federation from France showed no interest in participating. The field 
work was spread over a period of 6 months and interviews were conducted in 2008.  
The interviews were conducted on the basis of a semi-structured guideline which was developed for 
this purpose and adapted according to the respective interviewee (for example adapted in regard to 
contextual conditions or according to the results of the literature research of the organization). The 
NeuroPrion Risk Control Group agreed to the guideline and included 30 main questions regarding the 
risk perception of Transmissible Spongiform Encephalopathies (TSE), evaluation of implemented TSE 
risk regulation, in particular amendments to TSE risk regulation as suggested within the TSE roadmap, 
evaluation of risk communication on TSEs as well as questions regarding stakeholder involvement in 
public policy-making. The guideline also encompassed questions of available TSE knowledge and an 
evaluation of TSE research and research funding. Questions regarding the application of the 
precautionary principle were also addressed. The actual interview time varied considerably, from 35 
minutes up to several hours, with a median of 90 minutes. Almost all interviews were recorded (if 
not possible, notes were taken). The interviews were then transcribed and subsequently analyzed.  
The interviews were analysed with qualitative content analysis according to Philipp Mayring (1994, 
2000; Gläser & Laudel 2006). Mayring’s content analysis is a systematic approach guided by rules that 
combine an inductive development of categories with the deductive application of these categories. 
His approach is characterised by the fact that the focus for the analysis is not the frequency of 
information, but the actual content. The relevant content of the information, according to the 
identified categories, was extracted, evaluated, configured and subsequently interpreted. The 
categories that we applied were based upon the interview guideline; consequently, the guideline was 
a pre-defining mean for the analysis and interpretation. The aim of the systematic analysis was to 
reconstruct the different perspectives of the interviewees. 
                                                          
5 
Only organizations were named in the report, the actual interviewed experts were kept anonymous. 
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The report was written on the basis of the literature research and the content analysis of the 
interviews. The country reports as well as the EU level report were sent to the interviewees after 
finalization. All interviewees had the opportunity to read, review and comment on the respective 
country or EU report before it became part of the final report. Several replies were made by the 
interviewees that went into the final version of the report. 
The country reports were then analyzed in a comparative study: cross-national as well as cross-
stakeholders. Differences in the responses as well as similarities were identified between the 
countries as well as between the different stakeholder groups.  
The work got further input from various discussions on the presentation of preliminary results, for 
example at the Prion 2008 meeting in Spain, as well as common meetings of PrioNet Canada with the 
NeuroPrion Risk Control Group in the context of the Prion 2008 and Prion 2009 meetings in Greece. 
Furthermore, results were presented and discussed in a dedicated meeting of governmental TSE risk 
managers from 14 countries in Winter 2009 in Brussels. 
 
2 The TSE Roadmap and its Proposed Amendments 
“We have come to the stage that amendments of certain measures could be envisaged without 
endangering the health of the consumer or the policy of eradicating BSE, provided that the positive 
trend continues and scientific conditions are in place.” (European Commission 2005, p 4) Based on 
that reasoning, the TSE roadmap was agreed to by the EC and the Member States and published on 
15th July 2005. The TSE roadmap is not a final legislative paper, but should be considered more as a 
“catalogue of options” for further discussion with stakeholders. In that regard, the TSE roadmap 
followed a new communication strategy that explicitly invited all concerned stakeholders to 
participate in the discussion process. This discussion process had to take place within a given time 
frame as amendments are suggested for short, medium and long term. In total, seven amendments 
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were suggested for the short and medium term (2005-2009) and four amendments for the long term 
(2009-2014). This time frame was also communicated from the beginning to the involved 
stakeholders, so that they will know when each issue is at stake for discussion. 
 
The TSE Roadmap covers the primary measures enforced at the EU-wide level to control the 
epidemics of BSE and scrapie affecting cattle and small ruminant populations, respectively. The seven 
main topics selected within the roadmap deal with this subject. What specific rationales and ideas 
are behind these measures? Epidemiological studies had indicated that the exposure of calves in 
their first year of life to BSE infected meat and bone meal (MBM) played a major role in disease 
transmission. This led to a ban on the feeding of MBM to ruminants, implemented in 1988 in the 
United Kingdom and subsequently (1994) throughout the European Union (EU). Although the ban 
significantly decreased exposure, it proved in itself insufficient to eliminate the disease. Further 
measures were focused on the so-called Specified Risk Materials (SRM): the animal tissues in which 
BSE infectivity is highest, i.e. mainly brain, spinal cord, retina and distal ileum. The removal of SRM 
from feed and food chains in order to diminish the residual risk posed by MBM has been enforced by 
several countries since the mid 1990s and at the EU-wide level since 2000. Moreover, within the BSE 
outbreaks, the compulsory culling of all animals potentially exposed to the same risk factors (i.e. 
animals of the same birth cohort of the BSE case) was required to diminish other residual sources of 
infection. The high risk in the UK led to implementation of additional restrictions limiting the export 
of beef and beef products. Parallel to the risk management measures, a comprehensive surveillance 
system for BSE (and on a sample base for small ruminants) was put into place in the European Union 
(EU) in 2001. The surveillance system was based on clinical surveillance as well as systematic rapid 
testing of at-risk animals over 24 months of age (emergency slaughter and animals that died on the 
farm) and healthy slaughtered cattle over 30 months of age. This system required an enormous 
surveillance effort (i.e. about ten million cattle tested per year). Finally, a system was developed 
which allowed risk management interventions to be proportionate to risk by categorizing countries 
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based on their differing BSE risk. The first categorization approach was implemented by the Scientific 
Steering Committee (SSE) of the EU. This was much more complex and laborious compared to the 
successor system proposed by the OIE, the international animal world health organization. While the 
bulk of the quoted measures effectively controlled the epidemic and determined a clear decline in 
the disease trend, these same measures also looked to be disproportionate and in need of some 
revision by the mid 2000's: the idea of the TSE Roadmap emerged and was put forth. 
 
Short and medium term amendments:6 
1. Specified Risk Material: The strategic goal is “to ensure and maintain the current level of 
consumer protection by continuing to assure the safe removal of SRM but modify list/age 
based on new & evolving scientific opinion”. 
2. Feed Ban: The strategic goal is ”a relaxation of certain measures of the current total feed ban 
when certain conditions are met”. 
3. Monitoring programmes: The strategic goal is “to reduce the numbers of tests of bovine 
animals and at the same time continue to measure the effectiveness of the measures in 
place with better targeting of surveillance activity.” 
4. Categorization of countries according to their BSE risk: The strategic goal is a “simplification 
of the categorisation criteria and conclusion of the categorisation of the countries before 1 
July 2007.”7 
5. Review of culling policy with regards to TSEs in small ruminants: The strategic goal is a 
“review and relaxation of the eradication measures for small ruminants taking into account 
the new diagnostic tools available but ensuring the current level of consumer protection.” 
                                                          
6
 For the following: The TSE Roadmap: http://ec.europa.eu/food/food/biosafety/bse/roadmap_en.pdf 
7
 This amendment was already put in place at the time when the interviews were conducted. Prior to that 
modification towards a simplified categorization by the World Organisation for Animal Health (Organisation 
Mondiale de la Santé Animale, OIE), the Scientific Steering Committee of the European Union was responsible 
for determining and catergorization of the countries according to their BSE status, the so-called geographical 
BSE Risk Assessment (GBR). Between SSC and OIE the EFSA was transitionally responsible for the 
categorization of the countries.  
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6. Cohort culling in bovine animals: The strategic goal is “to stop the immediate culling of the 
cohorts.” 
7. UK restrictions: The strategic goal is “to discuss the lifting of the additional restrictions on 
exports of beef and beef products from the UK if the present conditions are complied with.”8 
 
Long term amendments: The strategic goal of the long term amendments is “to modify 
measures in line with current technology and newly evolving scientific knowledge”, with 
focus on the following topics: 
1. Surveillance 
2. Specified Risk Material 
3. Certification of Herds 
4. Genetic Resistance in Goats 
The TSE roadmap also suggests “alternative scenarios if the positive trend does not continue. Three 
different scenarios are considered: “non-favourable trend of BSE in certain Member States”, the 
large scale incidence of “BSE in small ruminants” or confirmed cases of “Chronic Wasting Disease 
(CWD) in cervids”. 
The aim of this project was to gather the risk perception of the concerned public, as well as the risk 
managers and their respective advisors, in regard to the proposed amendments: What does the 
public think about these relaxation measures? Are the amendments considered to be appropriate or 
does the public feel the contrary? What are judged to be the most appropriate measures? Which 
measures appear to be more sensible, which less sensible? Where are there differences between the 
risk perception of different stakeholder groups within one country and between the examined 
Member States? The following analysis will give evidence of the differences and similiarities which 
we have identified. 
                                                          
8
 This amendment was transformed and the UK restrictions lifted in 2006. 
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3. Risk Perception of TSE in Europe 
General speaking, risk management, risk communication and risk perception are three processes that 
interact. The risk management measures are supposed to be communicated to the public and hence 
influence the risk perception of the general public. Interest in public risk perception has raised 
considerably since the 1980’s – a phenomenon which cuts across all industrialised countries. 
Frequently, the increased interest in risk perception among the public is interpreted as an indicator 
of the crisis of late, or recursive, modernity, whereby society, faced with unintended side effects and 
fall-outs, increasingly questions the capabilities of risk management (Beck 1986) and (Adam 1995). 
The BSE crisis is only one example of this. Against this background, the findings on risk perception 
among the populace become increasingly significant. However, the criticism has to be raised that, 
although theoretical awareness on the part of risk management of the importance of risk perception 
research has risen dramatically, in actual practice the findings of perception research are neither 
utilised in a systematic and consistent manner nor systematically tied into the decision-making 
process in risk management (Dowler et al. 2006), (Renn & Benighaus 2006). 
There are a number of approaches to probe into social risk perception. Depending on their origins, 
they tend to be inspired by social psychology, cognition psychology, anthropology or sociology and 
orientated accordingly. Slovic says that “There is no such thing as ’real risk’ or ‘objective risk’.” (Slovic 
1992). There are differences among people about risk perceptions and there are determinants of risk 
perceptions.9 Experts perceive risks differently than non-experts. In evaluating a risk, experts are 
(supposedly) guided by the available scientific and technological knowledge base, the so-called facts. 
The perceptions among the public, on the other hand, may be only marginally informed by these 
facts and they frequently don’t have the right knowledge to ‘translate’ those facts. Last but not least, 
the media play a decisive role in what is perceived as risk by the public. A study on BSE demonstrated 
that the peoples of Germany, Finland, Italy and the UK arrived at different risk conceptualizations 
                                                          
9
 For an elaborate review of determinants of risk perception: see Renn 2008, in particular chapter 4. 
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due to the influence of their national media (Bauer et al. 2006). In order to facilitate effective risk 
communication, it is essential to arrive at an improved understanding of the risk perceptions of the 
public and its stakeholders in regard to BSE and other TSEs. 
 
In the following section a comparison of the risk perceptions and the evaluations of risk management 
measures of the stakeholders, risk managers and scientific advisors of the five countries will be given. 
The following sub-chapter describes some more general assessments of (1) TSE risks, (2) general 
reactions towards the TSE roadmap and (3) a general assessment of the most important 
measurements currently in place that we found in the five examined countries. 
 
3.1 Assessment of TSE risks 
When asked about their TSE risk assessment we found no distinguishable differences between the 
five examined countries. All interviewees in all countries agreed that the risks from BSE and other 
TSEs have diminished – a fact that was ascribed to adequate risk management measurements and 
their strict enforcement. A representative from the German meat industry considered the risk 
resulting from BSE as “insignificant”. The current BSE risk “has not been zero, but it is as close to zero 
as you can get” – this view of a scientific advisor to the UK government was quite representative for 
all stakeholder groups in all countries. Although basically all consumer representatives in all countries 
agreed on that, too, an interviewee from a German consumer organisation stressed that BSE as such 
is still a risk to humans due to the fact that several scientific questions have not been answered yet. 
An Italian cattle breeder representative mentioned that the BSE crises have stimulated efforts to 
enhance food safety. 
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3.2 General Reactions towards TSE Roadmap 
Risk managers in all countries (except Italy, where awareness and knowledge of the TSE roadmap 
was very limited) replied that they appreciated the TSE roadmap as a worthwhile initiative by the 
European Commission (EC) that sufficiently covers all concerned areas. TSE risk managers of all 
countries declared that they consider relaxation of current TSE risk regulation a necessary step 
forward, as the declining TSE figures have shown that the measures have become increasingly 
disproportionate. Belgium risk managers mentioned in the interview that cost-benefit considerations 
are central for any decision regarding relaxation of current legislation. They continued that, whereas 
the costs for TSE regulation were absolutely justified in the past, a new prioritization is obviously 
needed. Particularly in the UK, but also in German and in French interviews, the idea of science-
based or risk-based decision-making was prominent. They concluded that, despite relaxation of the 
current regulation, the precautionary principle would still be applied. Contrary to the precautionary 
principle where scientific knowledge is typically insufficient, French risk managers suggested in the 
interviews that the current level of knowledge would be sufficient to justify a relaxation of current 
measures. During the interview, representatives of the UK meat industry framed this idea as a move 
towards a system of proportionality supported by risk-based decisions. The TSE roadmap was 
considered by the interviewee of the UK meat industry to be an excellent example of a successful 
tool that has scientific process at the centre of any deliberation in regard to modifying risk regulation. 
Stakeholders from agriculture and industry in Germany, Belgium and the UK stated in interviews that 
they very much welcomed suggestions made by the TSE roadmap as timely and sufficiently based on 
science. Apart from the interviewee of the French meat industry that showed some apprehension in 
regard to consistency of certain aspects of the document, all other French stakeholders reacted 
positively to the ideas of the roadmap. In Italy, knowledge of the TSE roadmap and its envisaged 
changes appeared not to be broadly distributed. At the same time, several general reservations in 
Italy were raised in the study, in particular about whether control of the disease can be safeguarded 
once the regulations change. The German and UK meat industry, as well as Italian farmer’s 
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representatives, stressed that any amendment to current legislation should be accompanied by a 
strong and transparent communication strategy directed towards consumers. The latter was also 
emphasized in all interviews with consumer representatives in all countries. 
The reactions of the consumer associations showed a different pattern. In all the examined countries 
interviewees from consumer organisations replied that, in their view, the general public are most 
likely unaware of the TSE roadmap. The representatives from consumer associations we interviewed 
knew the TSE roadmap only because of their professional involvement, but would be, otherwise, 
unaware of it as well. German consumer representatives tended to stress that the regulations of the 
past led to a containment of the risk. They hence stressed that the measurements should be kept in 
order to maintain the low BSE figures and keep the current level of consumer protection. 
Consequently, only minor relaxations of current regulation were endorsed by them. Italian consumer 
representatives stated similar reservations, but from an even more concerned standpoint; they told 
us that they were afraid that, by introducing relaxation measures, control of BSE and other TSEs 
would no longer be guaranteed, hence the degree of food safety might suffer. UK consumer 
representatives stressed again the importance of sufficient knowledge, they emphasized in the 
interviews that if scientific knowledge would conclusively support relaxation measures, consumers 
would go along with it. 
 
3.3 Most Important Measures Currently in Place 
Asked which measures currently in place were seen as most important, the removal of specified risk 
material (SRM) and the feed ban were seen by all interviewees in all examined countries as most 
important. Having said this, which of these is seen as most important varies according to the country. 
Typically, SRM removal was considered to be the core measure for the protection of public health, 
whereas the feed ban was considered to be the core measure for the protection of animal health, for 
example by risk managers in Germany and the UK. In Belgium and France, both measures were seen 
as key, but the majority of interviewed stakeholders put some emphasize on the removal of SRMs. 
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Italy turned out to be different as all interviewed risk managers, scientific advisors and all 
stakeholders stressed that they consider the feed ban to be the most fundamental tool for risk 
regulation, whereas SRM removal was evaluated by them as important but possibly subject to 
modification. Contrary to the risk managers, the representatives of the UK meat industry also 
stressed control of the feed ban as the most important measure. The surveillance regime was 
perceived by Belgium, French, Italian and UK governmental risk regulators in our study as a useful 
tool to gain knowledge about the epidemic, but was not considered (in contrast to Germany) to be a 
measure necessary for consumer protection . 
 
3.4 Evaluation of Specific Measures Suggested Within TSE Roadmap 
After the more general assessments we asked all interviewees for their evaluation of specific aspects 
of the measures intended for relaxation within the TSE roadmap.  
3.4.1 Specified Risk Material (SRM) 
Specified Risk Material: The strategic goal is “to ensure and maintain the current level of 
consumer protection by continuing to assure the safe removal of SRM but modify list/age 
based on new & evolving scientific opinion”. 
 
We found a wide range of opinions within the examined countries in regard to the SRM legislation. 
All interviewees agreed (except Italy) that they consider the SRM control as the core measurement to 
safeguard public health in regard to TSE risks. 
All UK interviewees were united by their request for strong scientific evidence and very careful 
considerations for any amendment under consideration. All interviewed UK representatives agreed 
that, if scientific evidence is not conclusive, it would be advisable to stick to the legislation as it is 
now. 
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In France, responses to the evaluation of the potential relaxation of SRM material varied 
considerably in the interviews. Risk managers in France, supported by their scientific advisors, were 
much more in favour of amendments, while all other French stakeholders consulted were generally 
against modifications, including representatives of farming and meat industry associations. 
We found the Belgians more reluctant than any other country to allow any relaxation of the removal 
of SRMs. Only the representatives of the meat industry hesitantly agreed on amendments, provided 
that the current level of consumer protection can be maintained as a necessary precondition. 
Belgium consumer representatives tended to argue strictly against any relaxation of the current SRM 
removal practice. 
In Germany, as in France, we didn’t find a congruent response by the various stakeholders: Whereas 
the one interviewee of the German meat industry described the current legislation as “exaggerated” 
and in need of change, consumers did not feel the need to modify anything regarding this core 
measure at the moment. The interviewee of the German risk management was in favour of modest 
relaxations of SRM removal, whereas the interviewees representing the German farmers and 
breeders did not argue for amendments to this core measure. The latter emphasized, instead, their 
wish to have the same regulation applied in Germany as elsewhere. (The German legislation on TSE is 
still in some regards more rigorous than in other EU countries, which was complained about in 
particular by the meat industry and farming industry.) 
In the Italian case study, as already mentioned, risk managers as well as all other stakeholders clearly 
focused on the feed ban as the most important measure in place. Not surprisingly, Italian risk 
managers interviewed did not have strong caveats in regard to relaxation of SRM removal. 
 
3.4.2 Feed Ban 
Feed Ban: The strategic goal is ”a relaxation of certain measures of the current total feed ban 
when certain conditions are met”. 
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In Italy all interviewees were unified in assessing the risk regulation tool ‘feed ban’ as the most 
important measure of all. This position clearly distinguished them from all other countries examined. 
The feed ban was considered in Italy as the essential tool, with no room for any relaxation to be seen, 
as the fear of a new epidemic was still strong there. On the contrary, according to Italian 
interviewees, the feed ban should be strictly and rigorously enforced and meat industry products 
should be continuously monitored.  
No consistent response emerged in Belgium: risk managers consulted were less keen on relaxations 
(theoretically yes, but practically no, as it appears impossible to sufficiently control a relaxed feed 
ban with current methods). Belgium consumers’ representatives voted unanimously against 
relaxations of the feed ban, whereas other stakeholders generally agreed on relaxations or even 
directly asked for them, like the interviewed Belgium farmers. 
Similarly in France: The risk managers examined tended to be wary of relaxing the feed ban, whereas 
interviewees representing French meat industry and farmers, on the contrary, forcefully asked for 
them. Like their German counterparts (see below), conventional French farmers used the same 
argument: Once negatively tested via active surveillance, the meat and bone meal can definitely be 
used for feeding farm animals, except ruminants. 
No consistent position were found in Germany: Risk managers, like some members of the farming 
community and meat industry consulted, considered potentially relaxing the total feed ban – 
provided that intra-species recycling and other “unnatural feeding practices” (interviewee from a 
German farming association) would be abolished forever. Representatives from German farming 
organizations mentioned that, due to the active surveillance system, negatively tested offal from the 
slaughterhouse should be considered suitable for consumption by other omnivores. An interviewee 
representing an important German organic farming organization took yet another position: The 
current control system for feed was considered insufficient to allow relaxations of the total feed ban. 
German consumer associations consulted were more strictly against amendments, as they don’t 
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want “too much changed” in regard to the feed ban. If changes should be implemented at all, they 
need to be justified by good scientific evidence. 
In the UK, all interviewees wanted to maintain the feed ban – at least in theory and for different 
reasons. In practice, good scientific evidence and a sophisticated communication strategy toward the 
general public would change this attitude - the underlying assumption of the UK interviewees - as 
there appears to be no general reluctance to relaxing the feed ban, provided that certain standards 
are always kept. They continued that, for those animals that are verifiably not susceptible to TSEs, 
such as pigs and poultry, the feeding of animal protein could be reconsidered. Having said that, the 
UK consumers association involved vividly expressed their reluctance to accept any feeding practice 
“against nature” which has “horrified” the UK public in the past. 
 
3.4.3 Surveillance activity 
Monitoring programmes: The strategic goal is “to reduce the numbers of tests of bovine 
animals and at the same time continue to measure the effectiveness of the measures in 
place with better targeting of the surveillance activity.” 
 
All risk managers involved in all examined countries agreed on the importance and necessity of 
further surveillance activity, but for different reasons: Surveillance activity was regarded as a tool to 
monitor the epidemiology of the disease or to cross-check other regulatory measures – a view that 
was given in all countries, except Germany. Contrary to all others, German risk managers considered 
surveillance as a tool for food safety and not just an epidemiological tool. This latter perspective was 
also shared by German and UK consumer representatives.  
With a few differences of opinion, all risk management interviewees included and most stakeholder 
groups examined would, more or less, welcome relaxations of the current surveillance activity – 
including UK and German consumer representatives. Without exception, all industrial 
20 
 
representatives supported relaxation of the present monitoring system. Only Italian consumers 
tended to consider a slight extension in regard to atypical cases of TSE (see below).  
The current surveillance system was regarded by most as “disproportionate” when faced with the 
decreased BSE figures in the entire European Union. In particular, the age limit for routine testing in 
the abattoirs should be lifted in order to reduce the current rate of TSE tests and to save money. This 
was the congruent position that we found in the interviews with all risk managers in all countries 
examined.10  
A slightly different position was raised by representatives of UK farmers and breeders who appraised 
the surveillance system as a very important tool to keep consumer confidence up. They emphasized 
that, as when the EU-wide surveillance system replaced the Over Thirty Months Scheme (OTMS)11 in 
the UK a few years ago, relaxation of the current system should be done extremely cautiously. Having 
said that, UK farming organizations regarded the sharp decline of BSE cases in the UK as evidence 
that a moderate relaxation of this measure should be considered justified. 
All interviewees in all countries stressed that any relaxation should be accompanied by an 
appropriate communication strategy. 
With the exception of the Italian consumers and risk managers consulted, all other interviewees 
agreed that routine testing should not be extended in regard to atypical forms of TSEs. Atypicals 
were regarded as scientifically interesting, but not a risk to humans as they are already covered by 
current risk reducing measures and, therefore, do not deserve special regulatory treatment – this 
view was shared by all interviewees. Italian consumer’s representatives and risk managers, on the 
contrary, made clear in the interviews that they would not exclude the idea of a moderate extension 
of the surveillance regime in order to capture the atypicals, too. 
 
                                                          
10
 It must be kept in mind that the interviews were conducted at a time when the EC and its Member States were 
actually in the process of lifting the age limit for BSE testing since transposed into law: the age limits for BSE 
testing were raised to 48 months in 2009 in the European Union. 
11
 OTMS meant that all cattle of 30 months of age and older were not slaughtered, but culled and the meat 
destroyed in order to avoid any human consumption. The OTMS was a UK-only measurement. 
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3.4.4 Categorization of Countries and the Role of OIE 
Categorization of countries according to their BSE risk: The strategic goal is a “simplification 
of the categorisation criteria and conclusion of the categorisation of the countries before 1 
July 2007.” 
 
Prior to the suggested amendment, the categorization of BSE countries was based on the BSE risk 
assessment of the EU Scientific Steering Committee (SSC) (see footnote 4). 
In most of the countries in our study, only risk managers appeared to be knowledgeable enough to 
have an opinion on the new OIE categorization system, whereas most other stakeholders stated that 
they were not familiar (enough) with these changes, with the exception of a few German and UK 
stakeholders who had views on the new OIE system.  
Italian and Belgium risk managers in our interviews, for example, supported the idea of a simplified 
system and the OIE as an adequate organization to perform this task. In particular, the fact that the 
OIE is an international organization which enjoys a good reputation within the veterinarian and 
regulatory communities worldwide was mentioned by them. 
Although French risk managers were, when asked, supportive of the new OIE system, their scientific 
advisors judged the new categorization approach as not fully scientifically sufficient compared to the 
SSC assessment of the geographical BSE risk status (GBR). 
In the UK, stakeholders' views varied: On the one hand, some interviewees raised several 
reservations regarding the new system, ranging from being scientifically insufficient to being 
politically motivated. On the other hand, the change already implemented was considered by others 
as neutral (such as for UK risk management). Only the UK meat industry and most farmer 
representatives explicitly expressed their approval for the new system and for the OIE. 
As in the UK, German stakeholders showed, in our study, no consistent viewpoint and displayed 
similar reservations – though from different stakeholder groups. UK and German risk regulators (and 
their scientific advisors) showed similar reservations in regard to both the new system and the new 
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organizational background. The “old” EU system, where the geographical BSE risk status was 
assessed by an independent EU Scientific Steering Committee (SSC), was considered to be much 
more transparent compared to the current OIE system. However, it was also mentioned by German 
scientific advisors of the government that the OIE enjoys more international trust and recognition 
than the SSC – that was regarded by them as useful for the acceptance of the results of the OIE 
assessment. Contrary to the UK, representatives of the German meat industry raised clear doubts 
regarding the new system and also in regard to the OIE: The new OIE system was described by them 
to be much more simplistic compared to the old SSC system. Furthermore, the OIE appeared to one 
German meat industry interviewee as an opaque circle of actors from vested interests – and he 
considered this potentially problematic in the future. Contrary to the meat industry, German 
farmers’ representatives very much welcomed the new movement and the shift of responsibility they 
appreciated the OIE as an adequate organization to perform this task. 
Hardly any of the consumer stakeholder group or industrial stakeholders involved in France, Belgium 
or Italy was aware of the new system and its implications. Hence no opinions were given in regard to 
that, nor in regard to the OIE as the new responsible organization. Interviewees representing 
consumers in all countries just stated that simplification (as the ultimate objective for the 
amendments made here) appeared desirable to them in general. 
 
3.4.5 Review of Culling Policy in Regard to Small Ruminants 
Review of culling policy with regards to TSEs in small ruminants: The strategic goal is a 
“review and relaxation of the eradication measures for small ruminants taking into account 
the new diagnostic tools available but ensuring the current level of consumer protection.” 
 
The culling policy on small ruminants (such as goats or sheep) was not particularly relevant for most 
of the contacted stakeholders and risk managers in the countries examined, apart from France and 
23 
 
Belgium. In none of the countries did industry or consumer representatives voice an opinion on this 
issue.  
French risk managers showed no consistent response in regard to the culling policy of small 
ruminants, as some of them agreed on the necessity of a review of culling policy, whereas others 
disagreed. But all agreed that they consider the current level of knowledge on small ruminants as 
insufficient, compared to BSE in cattle. According to them that should be regarded as worrying, as 
scrapie has not been excluded as the cause for the emergence of the BSE agent in cattle. The French 
risk advisors stressed that they would like to push the idea that, in light of new scientific evidence, 
measures on small ruminants urgently need a new risk assessment.  
Like in France, Belgium risk managers have shown no consistent opinion in this matter. They argued 
that they found the whole sector problematic and not fully under control.  
 
3.4.6 Cohort Culling in Cattle 
Cohort culling in bovine animals: The strategic goal is “to stop the immediate culling of the 
cohorts.” 
 
Belgium, French and UK risk managers interviewed did not agree with a relaxation of the cohort 
culling in cattle, although for different reasons: Belgium and French risk regulators simply could not 
see scientific evidence to suggest the abolition of cohort culling in cattle. Other Belgium stakeholders 
included in our study, such as consumers associations, agreed upon potential relaxation of the cattle 
cohort culling scheme. Representatives of French farmers and breeders and French risk managers did 
not see a need for relaxation of culling, but for differing reasons than their risk managers. On the one 
hand, they said that only very few animals would be effected by this measure. On the other hand, 
cohort culling would keep consumers' confidence in the quality of beef. Having said that, French 
farmers' representatives showed no understanding of why negatively tested animals (via the active 
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surveillance system) should not be considered suitable for eating. Interviewees representing the 
Belgian meat industry, on the contrary, would support the idea of relaxing the cohort culling policy. 
The situation in the UK is different from all other countries as they have had the OTM scheme in the 
past (see above, footnote 8) where all cattle 30 months of age and above were killed, but no cohorts. 
When they converged with the EU system they had to deal with the problem of cohort culling as one 
of the legal requirement of EC 999/2001. After the abolishment of the OTMS, cohort culling was one 
of the measures regarded by risk managers as restoring consumer confidence. Hence, according to 
the UK interviewees, there is no need for change here from a UK perspective.  
Contrary to all other EU Member States, Germany decided upon the abolishment of cohort culling in 
cattle in 2007 covered by the TSE roadmap.12 Since then all cohort animals within a herd where BSE 
was identified are kept under veterinary surveillance until the end of their productive life, only then 
are they culled. According to risk managers consulted, this step was requested by all German 
stakeholders, at least within the agricultural domain, and it has been judged positively since its 
introduction. A German consumer representative even showed surprise as to why no other EU 
Member State has abolished cohort culling in cattle. According to the consumer interviewee, cohort 
culling would not increase consumer protection hence there is no need to maintain that measure. 
German farming representatives even asked for a further relaxation: to abolish culling of cattle after 
their productive life: Cohort animals should be treated as all other cattle and once tested negatively 
to BSE in the abattoir there is no need to keep their meat out of the food chain (see, for a similar 
response, the French farmers' representative above). 
 
3.4.7 UK Restrictions 
UK restrictions: The strategic goal is “to discuss the lifting of the additional restrictions on 
exports of beef and beef products from the UK if the present conditions are complied with.” 
                                                          
12
 This means that the German government had officially applied for the abolishment of cohort culling in the 
framework of TSE Roadmap and got approval for their request. 
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From a UK standpoint it appears clear that the lifting of the UK ban was considered top priority by 
risk managers as well as others and when the ban was actually lifted it was highly welcomed. All 
interviewed UK stakeholders, including consumers, were relieved and very positive towards the 
lifting of the ban and of, therefore, becoming a full member of the European Union regime again. 
This amendment in the context of the TSE roadmap was considered to be top priority for TSE policy-
makers in the UK. Unsurprisingly, the day of the UK re-entry into the international beef market and 
the lifting of the UK ban (May 2006) was called a “red letter day for farmers” by UK agricultural 
representatives. 
Contrary to the UK position, French risk manages as well as all other stakeholders interviewed made 
clear that they fully disagreed on the lifting of UK restrictions. Only AFFSA, the scientific advisors of 
French risk management, supported the lifting of the UK ban as there are no scientific objections 
against the re-entry of the UK. French risk managers explained that they, historically, lack confidence 
in the UK control and enforcement system (not only in regard to the UK management of BSE, but 
also, for example, in regard to their handling of the foot and mouth disease).  
Belgium stakeholders tended to agree on this amendment in regard to the UK, even with some 
skepticism towards the UK regulatory system. Belgium consumer and farming representatives 
remarked that the UK is still requested to prove that they are in full control of the disease. 
In Germany no objections were raised at all against lifting the UK ban. It was taken for granted by all 
German interviewees that, as long as all given requirements are met, there is no need to exclude the 
UK any longer or to treat UK meat and cattle differently. On the contrary, UK meat and beef 
producers should be treated the same as anyone else in the EU. 
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3.4.8 Long-Term Amendments: Surveillance, SRM, Certification of Herds, 
Genetic Resistance in Goats 
Long term amendments: The strategic goal of the long term amendments is “to modify measures in 
line with current technology and new evolving scientific knowledge”, with the focus on the following 
topics: (1) Surveillance; (2) Specified Risk Material; (3) Certification of Herds; (4) Genetic Resistance in 
Goats. 
 
All stakeholders in all countries stressed the necessity of solid scientific knowledge as the basis for 
any amendments suggested. Only a few explicit ideas of the long-term amendments of the TSE 
roadmap were considered by some stakeholders, in particular by risk managers consulted. The 
interviewed UK risk managers asked for amendments on a “proportionate level” in the long term, for 
example in regard to relaxations of the surveillance system. The herd certification was not regarded 
as a priority by them; genetic resistance in goats, instead, was regarded as important and helpful for 
the UK. 
Contrary to UK risk managers, the scientific advisor for German risk management, and also 
representatives from German cattle breeders, raised strong objections in the interview to the 
breeding of genetically resistant goats as potentially counteracting biodiversity. Having said that, 
goat husbandry has only limited economic meaning in Germany. 
Italian risk managers and breeders, in turn, were very positive regarding the possibility of managing 
TSE risks in small ruminant population by means of herd certification or genetic resistance. 
 
4 Roadmapping as an Appropriate Tool to Involve 
Stakeholders in Risk Controversial Topics? 
As already mentioned above, the crucial thing about risk perception is the implementation of its 
findings into risk governance. A roadmap approach is an inclusive approach to risk governance and 
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an attempt to take into account different risk perceptions and perspectives of stakeholders in order 
to arrive at a more socially robust decision making process and enhanced trust in risk management. 
 
We also addressed the issue of the meaning and practicality of the TSE Roadmap for stakeholder 
inclusion and improved risk decision-making with our interviewees. The roadmap was considered to 
be an excellent and suitable way of coming up with robust decisions via consultation – this was the 
general response we received in all countries by all stakeholder groups. The vast majority of our 
examined stakeholders found the given time frame of the roadmap useful as it allows them to plan 
their work. The most important observation we made, through all the stakeholders in all the 
countries, was that stakeholders want to see “the science behind” any decision in regard to 
amendments to TSE regulation. In particular, consumer representatives in our study demanded that 
the “science behind” should be explained in a language that can be understood by the public, free of 
jargon. As case control measures are pulled back it would be vital to check compliance and to make 
sure that any breaches are carefully and immediately reported, as a cover-up would not work and 
would only lead to public mistrust. This standpoint was stressed by representatives of both consumer 
and farmer associations. The TSE roadmap was considered to be a compromise between general 
ideas and technical data. As such, it was considered comprehensible for almost all stakeholder 
groups, as long as they have expert knowledge available. Having said this, it was made clear amongst 
others by many, particularly by consumer representatives, that the TSE roadmap in its current form 
would not be comprehensible to the broader public. 
Not all stakeholders who should be concerned by the TSE roadmap were actually aware of the 
existence of the roadmap. The most likely explanation for this is the fact that not all stakeholder 
groups informed by the European Commission via their representation in Brussels have forwarded 
the information to the national level. It was therefore requested by some interviewees that the EC 
should consider effective ways to ensure that the information is equally distributed to all concerned 
stakeholders on the Member State level. 
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Conclusions: 
The risk of TSEs is clearly on the decline in Europe due to the application of risk management 
measures in the past which effectively contained the risk – this view was shared amongst all 
stakeholders in the examined European countries. Additionally, relaxation measures to the current 
TSE risk regulation were seen as appropriate by all stakeholders providing that all amendments are 
scientifically based. 
The SRM control and the feed ban were considered by all countries as the most important measures 
in regard to TSE risk regulation. Any relaxation of these measures should be considered extremely 
carefully, based on solid scientific knowledge and accompanied by a strong communication strategy 
towards stakeholders, but also towards to the general public. 
The surveillance system is seen as another important measure, although most interviewees regarded 
the testing regime as a mere tool for the epidemiological monitoring of the disease. In that respect 
the active surveillance system should be kept for some years, although the current design of the 
regulation could be modified, that is relaxed. Meanwhile, the latter has been implemented and the 
age limit for testing lifted, both of which were met by the approval of all examined stakeholder 
groups. The TSE Roadmap process was welcomed as an adequate tool to involve stakeholders in a 
field of risk controversy. 
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